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ABSTRACT 
Over the last several decades, there has been an increase in U.S. naval 
involvement in supporting humanitarian assistance, disaster relief (HA/DR) operations. 
Cruiser and destroyer (CRUDES) platforms, two of the most heavily employed platforms 
in the United States Navy, are frequently tasked outside of their primary mission sets as a 
result of HA/DR events, both natural and man-made. This has placed enormous pressure 
upon these units, their crews, and fleet commanders, specifically in how to best prioritize 
their use for maximum mission accomplishment. Our analysis provides side-by-side 
comparisons of the cost and capabilities of the LCS and T-EPF platforms to CRUDES 
assets, and describes their ability to effectively support HA/DR operations. This analysis 
gives senior leadership and mission planners objective information regarding viable 
alternatives that could allow CRUDES assets to maintain focus on their primary mission 
objectives while maintaining the necessary flexibility to support HA/DR operations. 
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The U.S. Navy’s current motto of “a global force for good” is consistent with its 
existing role in world events and conflicts. From acting as a protector of maritime law 
through presence operations, to supporting allies in armed conflict, and in more recent 
history, responding to countries experiencing catastrophic weather events, the U.S. Navy’s 
resources constantly flex to meet the ever-evolving demands placed upon it. This lives up 
to the Department of Defense (DoD) mandate that the U.S. Armed Forces should be 
proficient in their abilities to “conduct, support, and lead stability operations with a level 
of proficiency equivalent to combat operations” (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
[CJCS], 2016). With its cruiser and destroyer (CRUDES) ship platforms, the Navy can 
execute multiple mission sets effectively as evidenced by their ability to quickly transition 
from integrated strike group operations to independent operations as the orders are given.  
However, the strain on these platforms is beginning to show, and CRUDES are 
becoming so task-saturated that they are often called away from their primary mission areas 
to support emergent events such as humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR; Apte 
& Yoho, 2018). The concept of the optimal HA/DR platform has been widely researched, 
and data has shown that CRUDES assets bring little utility to HA/DR operations (Apte & 
Yoho, 2018).  
The presence of a U.S. asset sent quickly to provide HA/DR support provides 
positive, intangible effects that cannot be overstated. Maritime platforms such as the 
Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) and Expeditionary Fast Transport (T-EPF) can be considered 
viable platforms that would not only reduce the strain on CRUDES assets by undertaking 
missions such as HA/DR, but also provide that intangible relief that affected countries 
experience knowing a swift U.S. response team will be on the way to provide support  
as well.  
The goal of our research is to examine the capabilities of the LCS and T-EPF as 
“first-responder” platforms during initial relief efforts. Our secondary goals are to examine 
the cost effectiveness of the LCS and T-EPF as compared to CRUDES assets, as well as 
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their ability to be as effective in supporting HA/DR missions as their CRUDES 
counterparts. While it is widely recognized that the CRUDES platforms are severely 
limited in their ability to respond when diverted to a crisis, we propose that perhaps a  
more direct approach of outfitting the LCS and T-EPF platforms’ modular mission bays 
with a critical aid package and potentially utilizing the two platforms in tandem during the 
initial onset of a disaster may provide the support that is lacking from the separate 
CRUDES assets. 
A. BACKGROUND 
The United States has refined its HA/DR response over the last 15 years, taking 
lessons learned from each operation and using the data to determine the optimal mix of 
ships and relief supplies and services necessary to meet each HA/DR mission. Everything 
from Carrier Strike Groups (CSG), Amphibious Readiness Groups (ARG), and 
independent deployers have been used to respond, and these units often have taken the lead 
in relief efforts. The common thread seems to be that a swift U.S. response is generally 
what initiates relief efforts until outside support is able to arrive on scene. CRUDES 
response to these disasters has been mixed, with several units at a time responding initially 
until the Strike/Readiness Group is able to arrive, at which point all ships work in concert 
to support the relief effort. To better illustrate this point, we mention a few key disasters in 
which the United States was a key player in providing HA/DR assistance with naval assets.  
1. 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami: Operation Unified Assistance   
On December 26, 2004, an enormous earthquake struck the western coast of 
Indonesia. The magnitude 9.0 quake triggered a massive tsunami, with the wave heights 
reaching up to 100 feet high. Thousands of people were reported missing throughout the 
region, and approximately 175,000 total deaths were recorded across Indonesia, Sri Lanka, 
India, and Thailand (Reid, 2019). Six months following the event, United Nations 
Secretary General called the earthquake the “largest natural disaster the organization has 
had to respond to on behalf of the world community, in the 60 years of our existence” (Sida 
& Wiles, 2006).  
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In response to this calamity, the United States dispatched Carrier Strike Group 
Nine, led by USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN 72) and its complement of support ships USS 
Shiloh (CG 67), USS Shoup (DDG 86), USS Benfold (DDG 65), and USNS Rainier (T-
AOE 7), to provide support to Indonesia. An Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG) led by 
USS Bonhomme Richard (LHD 6) and its accompanying ships which included USS Milius 
(DDG 69), USS Thach (FFG 43), and USS Bunker Hill (CG 52) were also diverted to 
provide support (Elleman, 2007). These assets along with a contingent of DoD civilian 
support units and first responders made up Operation Unified Assistance. As an aside, a 
general poll conducted after the disaster regarding the Indonesian population’s views 
towards America’s response indicated a 23% increase in positive public opinion  
(Wike, 2012).  
2.  2007 Cyclone Sidr: Operation Sea Angel II  
On November 15, 2007, Cyclone Sidr made landfall in Bangladesh and India, 
causing extremely high winds and massive flooding across the area. The Category 4 storm 
produced surges as high as 10 feet off the coastal areas, breaching its coastal and river 
embankments. The corresponding wind and flood damage decimated local fishing 
agricultural centers, destroyed schools and houses, and severely damaged many heritage 
sites. The flooding contaminated the drinking water supply with refuse and debris and left 
many areas without power. Approximately 3,400 people were killed, with thousands more 
missing or otherwise unaccounted for and close to 55,000 injured. The estimated damage 
to the region was approximately $1.7 billion, and to make matters even worse, this was the 
second natural disaster to hit the area in a 12-month span, the first being the monsoon 
season that caused almost $1.1 billion in agricultural losses and physical damage.  
In response to this event, the Navy dispatched its closest asset, USS Hopper (DDG 
70), a Flight II Guided Missile Destroyer, to the region. Due to the bottom topography of 
the region and the draft of the warship, Hopper was unable to provide any measurable 
response to support relief efforts (Apte & Yoho, 2018). The amphibious assault ship USS 
Kearsarge (LHD 3), along with elements of Amphibious Squadron 8 and the 22nd Marine 
Expeditionary Unit (MEU), were diverted from their Western Pacific deployment and 
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arrived in the region on November 22, 2007, delivering over 12,000 gallons of fresh water 
and over 73,000 pounds of relief aid to the storm-ravaged region. Kearsarge was relieved 
by USS Tarawa (CV 40) and the 11th MEU on December 3, 2007, which provided 
additional assistance in the region until the situation had stabilized enough for their 
departure (Kingsley & Vernon, 2011). A poll conducted after the relief efforts trended in 
favor of the U.S. response, though there were some negative press articles regarding the 
initial coordinating efforts (Kingsley & Vernon, 2011).  
3. 2010 Haiti Earthquake:  Operation Unified Response   
On January 12, 2010, a 7.0-magnitude earthquake struck Haiti, one of the most 
impoverished countries in the world. The epicenter of the earthquake was the capital city 
of Port-au-Prince, home to more than two million people. Aftershocks continued 
throughout that same day, and over 50 more were recorded over the following two weeks. 
It was the most devastating natural disaster to ever strike the country, claiming over 
230,000 lives and injuring or displacing several hundred thousand more (History, 2010).  
The catastrophic effects extended to the country’s infrastructure and government as 
well. The quake decimated the presidential palace and many of the government ministry 
buildings, seriously damaged all the hospitals in Port-au-Prince, and made its airport and 
seaport completely inoperable. Major roadways were made impassible due to debris and 
physical damage, power losses greatly reduced available communications services, and 
over 300,000 buildings and residences sustained either significant damage or had 
completely collapsed. As a result, the Haitian government made an immediate request for 
assistance from the United States (History, 2010).  
In response, the United States pledged its full support, directing a response led by 
the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the U.S. military. The 
Navy’s response was led by the aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson (CVN-70) and included 
the cruisers USS Normandy (CG-60) and USS Bunker Hill (CG-52), the destroyer  
USS Higgins (DDG-76), the frigate USS Underwood (FFG-36), as well as a host of other 
platforms. The collective DoD effort was titled Operation Unified Response and continued 
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to provide vital relief supplies and support to the stricken nation until June 1, 2010 
(Margesson & Taft-Morales, 2010). 
4. 2011 Japan Tsunami: Operation Tomodachi  
On March 11, 2011, northeastern Japan sustained a 9.0-magnitude earthquake 
(Carafano, 2011). Considered the largest earthquake in this region, it caused a tsunami with 
waves over 24 meters in height that swept across the region, causing destruction of 
infrastructure that comprised the road network, ports, railroads, and 190,000 buildings 
(Kajitani et al., 2011). Over 28,000 people were recorded as either dead or missing, and 
damage to the country’s infrastructure led to the complete loss or shortages of drinking 
water, shelter, electricity, and food. Over 15 million people in total were affected, and the 
destruction cost was estimated between $122 and 305 billion.  
A significant consequence brought on by the disaster was the damage to the 
Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant. The power loss and subsequent flooding caused by the 
earthquake rendered the generators unusable, resulting in the inability to cool the reactors 
and the pool for fuel rod storage. This caused overheating, which led to the release of 
radiation into the air, ground, and water. This was considered the highest level for a nuclear 
event on the International Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale recorded to date (Norio et 
al., 2011).  
Though officials ordered the evacuation of the area, some survivors stayed due to 
lack of transportation or fear of further exposure to radiation. While Japan has an 
earthquake warning system run by the country’s meteorological agency, the system was 
not entirely effective in this instance because some locations were not alerted due to lack 
of power and other areas did not respond because they had grown complacent from past 
false positives. It is difficult to evaluate the benefits of the system given these factors, but 
with a culture that educates about tsunamis coming after an earthquake and the need for 
preparedness, the early warning system did save lives (Percher, 2014). 
In support of the HA/DR operation, 15 U.S. Navy ships provided search and rescue 
(SAR), delivery of supplies ashore, troop movement, and aircraft refueling operations. 
Platforms included an aircraft carrier, an amphibious assault ship, three guided missile 
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cruisers (CGs; USS Cowpens [CG 63], USS Chancellorsville [CT 62] and USS Shiloh), 
six guided missile destroyers (DDGs; USS Mustin [DDG 89], USS McCamble, [DDG 85], 
USS Preble [DDG 46], USS John McCain [DDG 56], USS Fitzgerald [DDG 62], and  
USS Curtis Wilbur [DDG 54]), three dock landing ships, and one amphibious command 
ship. Support was also provided by eight Military Sealift Command (MSC) ships through 
the transfer of supplies needed for the relief efforts to responding U.S. Navy ships.  
Included in the eight MSC ships was one high-speed catamaran, MV Westpac Express 
(Aurelio et al., 2012).  
B. MOTIVATION  
The Navy, in particular CRUDES assets, has been in an enduring state of doing 
more with less. The collective strain to fill the mission gap was felt by the DDG and CG 
platforms with the retirement of the last guided missile frigate (FFG) in 2015. This gap, 
combined with the increased demand for supporting HA/DR missions, resulted in U.S. 
Navy ships being diverted over 366 times for humanitarian aid relief operations from 1979 
to 2000, as opposed to 22 times for combat operations in the same time period (Apte, 
Greenfield, Ingram & Yoho, 2013). There is no direct data available to suggest this number 
has gone up since 2000, but there are indicators that would support this idea. By the DoD’s 
own account, it responds to about 70–80 global disaster events each year alongside other 
governmental and non-governmental agencies. Due to the overtasking of ships to meet 
mission requirements, the general wear and tear on these ships increased; extensions on 
deployments led to longer, more extensive maintenance availabilities that only continued 
to grow worse over time. The stress on these crews grew at a comparable rate to their ships. 
The LCS was designed to fill the gap left by the retirement of the FFG platform and was 
built with modularity in mind to support those missions. As it stands now, the LCS can 
begin to explore its capabilities in taking HA/DR missions from its CG and DDG 
counterparts.  
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Before anyone can begin to understand the role the LCS and T-EPF can provide in 
supporting HA/DR operations, it must first be understood what exactly it is that those 
operations entail. HA and DR are nuanced in their definitions, so it is important that each 
is properly differentiated so that the core capabilities and competencies that are required to 
effectively perform HA/DR can be drawn out. The Navy has spent a considerable amount 
of effort in establishing baseline requirements for supporting natural disasters, and a wealth 
of information and research exists to support its claims. While it is widely established that 
there already exists a “right type” of ship class to support these operations, it is important 
to note that less capable classes of ships are still an important part of the equation. 
CRUDES ships, normally part of short-fused HA/DR responses, are spread so thin by the 
number of missions they undertake that other classes of ships are needed to fill the gaps. 
Finally, we can begin to address what capabilities the LCS and T-EPF have to provide 
support when the time is needed.  
A. HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE  
According to Lange and Quinn (2003), humanitarian assistance a collective effort 
to manage the distress endured by a population as a result of man-made or natural disasters. 
Supporting efforts include providing shelter to the displaced population and distributing 
essential supplies like food, water and other necessities to mitigate the consequences of the 
disaster. Once assistance has been rendered, the affected area is rebuilt and its population 
rehabilitated to an acceptable, pre-disaster condition. Jakovljecic (1987) states that 
humanitarian assistance should be a call to action necessitated by extraordinary 
circumstances in which the basic essential needs of a population are unable to be provided. 
Jackovljecic later expresses the criticality of organization, a systematic approach, and the 
inclusion of proactive measures to reduce improvisation, as well as ensuring adequate 
preparation for unique situations that may occur.  
International humanitarian assistance is executed by various international 
organizations, whether governmental or non-governmental; it is because of the 
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involvement of these organizations that humanitarian assistance efforts are practicable. 
Jackovljecic goes on to say that these organizations may be humanitarian in nature, 
meaning they render this kind of assistance as a primary mission, or they may be non-
humanitarian, meaning they perform this type of assistance for some other reason. 
Examples of non-humanitarian organizations providing humanitarian assistance are the 
United Nations and the U.S. Navy. 
B. DISASTER RELIEF  
As mentioned earlier, it is important to understand what disaster relief is. The DoD 
defines a disaster in Joint Publication 3-29 as  
a calamitous situation or event that occurs naturally or through human 
activities, which threatens or inflicts human suffering on a scale that may 
warrant emergency relief assistance from the United States Government or 
foreign partners. (CJCS, 2019, p. I-4)  
It goes on to define foreign disaster relief as 
assistance that can be used immediately to alleviate the suffering of foreign 
disaster victims that normally includes services and commodities as well as 
the rescue and evacuation of victims; the provision and transportation of 
food, water, clothing, medicines, beds, bedding, and temporary shelter; the 
furnishing of medical equipment, medical and technical personnel; and 
making repairs to essential services. (CJCS, 2019, p. GL-7) 
Non-DoD literature, such as that contained in the New World Encyclopedia (n.d.), 
also provides valuable information on this topic. Disaster relief, also known as emergency 
management, can be described as the necessary resources provided to those coping with 
losses caused by disasters. Effective disaster relief mitigation relies on thoroughly 
developed and integrated emergency plans involving both governmental and non-
governmental agencies. Most countries have specific laws or mandates that outline the 
procedures for declaring emergencies, and often designate specific agencies to coordinate 
these relief efforts. While disasters are tragic and result in injuries, losses of life,  
material goods and property, disaster relief is “a truly human response” (New World 
Encyclopedia, n.d.).  
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C. HA/DR CORE CAPABILITIES AND COMPETENCIES  
Moffat (2014) identified HA/DR as one of the core capabilities of the National 
Military Strategy (NMS). The presence of the U.S. Navy at sea projects sea power in 
maintaining freedom of the sea while deterring terrorism. HA/DR capabilities are valuable 
in projecting soft power and building positive foreign relationships and foreign perception 
of the United States. The concept of smart power can be used to explain the relationship 
between hard and soft power, and how it is essential in achieving strategic U.S. interest 
through HA/DR operations, which create new alliances while justifying regional presence 
for deterrence operations (Capie, 2015).  
Conducting HA/DR requires a very specific set of competencies that must be 
performed effectively, and there is an abundant amount of research that outlines the core 
competencies involved in supporting HA/DR operations. Kovacs and Spens (2007) 
described the distinct characteristics of humanitarian logistics during disaster relief 
operations. They explained the gaps or challenges faced during the preparatory, immediate 
response, and reconstruction phases in executing logistics operations given the complex 
environment surrounding most disaster relief efforts. They also created a framework that 
explains the integration of the diverse pool of actors and the logistical processes during 
disaster relief (Kovacs & Spens, 2007). Additionally, Idris and Soh (2014) identified 
human resources, logistics, and coordination as the three constructs important for success 
in HA/DR missions. 
By observing the various disaster traits, we can draw connections to the specific 
relief requirements that can mitigate those traits. Some of the key traits and relief elements 
are displayed in Figure 1.  
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Figure 1. Disaster Traits by Relief Requirements 
Demand created by a natural disaster or humanitarian event drives the need for 
supplies in terms of the resources and support vessels that provide them. It is hard to gauge 
what sort of emergency resources are going to be needed for any one given disaster, as 
those will differ from event to event. However, the U.S. Navy has done well to glean data 
from its years supporting HA/DR events to use in selecting assets capable of rendering the 
assistance necessary. Kovacs and Spens (2007) explained that the efforts of HA/DR are 
focused on transporting needed supplies, food, first aid, and equipment to desired locations 
while rescuing and evacuating affected persons in the disaster area. Humanitarian logistics 
is absolutely vital to the success of all disaster relief phases. They summarized the 
characteristics of humanitarian logistics as:  
• an aim to alleviate the suffering of survivors  
• a general lack of clear focus by the various stakeholders  
• variability in supplies  
• irregularities in demand 
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• transportation constraints leading to delays in the supply chain or 
evacuation  
• lack of infrastructure or communication assets  
After a catastrophe, the lack of information technology assets creates a gap in 
communication between stakeholders and in gathering and tracking data. Another 
challenge is access throughout the disaster area due to lack of infrastructure or road 
networks (Kovacs & Spens, 2007).  
Greenfield and Ingram (2011) took a qualitative approach at addressing some of 
those critical elements, such as aircraft/landing craft support, search and rescue (SAR), 
dry/refrigerated goods storage, fuel/water storage capacity or production, medical and 
personnel support, berthing space, roll-on/roll-off (RORO) capability, and transit speed. 
These capabilities were ranked among all the maritime platforms available to support 
HA/DR operations on a scale from 0 to 2, with a 0 indicating the asset has no ability 
to support a competency, a 1 for having a limited capacity to support a competency, and 
a 2 indicating the highest level of ability to support a competency (Greenfield & Ingram, 
2011).  
Based on disaster traits and relief requirements, it is obvious that a CRUDES asset 
would be ill-suited to support an HA/DR mission on its own; the platforms are simply too 
small to effectively carry out the mission for an extended period of time based on their 
general lack of storage, berthing, medical services, water production, and minimal capacity 
for RORO capabilities (Apte & Yoho, 2018).  
D. A FLEET STRETCHED TOO THIN 
As previously mentioned, the CRUDES platforms are considered the backbone of 
the U.S. Navy. They are multimission–capable ships that help the Navy and the United 
States provide a swift, global response to any threat. Thomas Callender (2017), a former 
senior research fellow for defense programs, stated  
The U.S. Navy provides a continuous global presence that enables our 
nation to respond quickly to crises around the world. These operations can 
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range from humanitarian and disaster relief assistance—such as the current 
post-Hurricane Maria operations in the Caribbean—to support of 
counterterrorism combat operations in Libya and Syria. 
Callender (2017) posited that given the current world climate and the United States’ 
commitments to its allies abroad, the Navy is stretching itself thin to the point of breaking. 
Global threats posed by the United States’ adversaries are typically deterred utilizing 
CRUDES assets, whether working in concert with an ESG or a CSG or even acting as 
independent deployers in line with U.S. international policies. However, with Navy ship 
numbers being at their lowest point since World War I, a less than 300-ship fleet is going 
to be hard-pressed to support even its primary missions, let alone a “surge in response to a 
major regional conflict or crisis” (Callender, 2017). He went on to mention an instance of 
surge response to an HA/DR mission involving the USS Wasp, an amphibious assault ship 
that was diverted from its primary deployment in Japan to support relief efforts in Puerto 
Rico, which caused cascading effects on the maintenance cycle of another amphibious 
assault ship desperately in need of repair. These sorts of cascading effects affect every 
aspect of the readiness of a ship, from training and deployment length to maintenance 
availability and crew proficiency. Similarly, the age of the Navy’s assets also does not help 
in this regard. Callender (2017) continued that all of these issues and reductions in assets 
“further inhibit the Navy’s ability to surge forces when needed. The Navy’s readiness score 
of ‘marginal’ in the 2018 Index thus seems well-deserved” (Callender, 2017). Therefore, 
in terms of meeting the task of power projection and primary mission support, there is a 
need for assets to assume duties in soft power engagements. 
E. LITTORAL COMBAT SHIP  
The LCS, part of a program originally announced on November 1, 2001, was 
intended to be a relatively inexpensive surface combatant for the U.S. Navy that would 
ideally be a long-term replacement for the guided missile frigate (Work, 2014). According 
to the OPNAV Instruction 3501.352A which outlines the operational capabilities and 
environment for the platform, the LCS is expected to “be able to operate offensively in the 
high-density, multi-threat littoral environment independently or as a member of a CSG, 
ESG, or surface action group.” To that end, the ship was built with a modular design 
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capable of being reconfigured to perform three primary missions: mine countermeasures 
(MCM), surface warfare (SUW), and anti-submarine warfare (ASW; Forbes et al., 2013). 
The one-mission capacity and focus of the LCS would be completely different than the 
Navy’s most comparable platforms, the CG, DDG, and FFG, which are designed to 
perform multiple missions at once.  
The LCS is further divided into two separate ship classes: Freedom and 
Independence. The two classes are aesthetically very different in design, but share the same 
key performance parameters. to the OPNAV instruction, the ship is comprised of all the 
necessary components included on all navy ships such as the basic mechanical, electrical, 
and computing systems, as well as core systems necessary to conduct operations such as 
navigation and self-defense. The ships possess the ability to protect themselves from most 
surface and subsurface threats, but should not operate in heavily opposed air defense 
environments unless they are “under the air defense coverage of a CSG, ESG, or an air 
defense asset such as an Aegis cruiser or destroyer” (Office of the Chief of Naval 
Operations [CNO], 2014). The ships have respective lengths of 387 feet and 421 feet, a 
cruising speed of 14 knots for up to 3,400 nautical miles, and sprint speed of 40 knots for 
up to 1,000 nautical miles (CNO, 2014). 
The LCS is manned with a crew of 50 sailors, including nine officers and 41 enlisted 
personnel. In addition to the permanent crew, both classes of the LCS have 
accommodations for up to 48 additional personnel, for a total of 98 people. The endurance 
of the LCS is approximately 14 days at sea before requiring a replenishment of provisions. 
Both ships have a single fueling station, however, unlike other comparable ship classes, 
the ships lack the capability for connected replenishment. Replenishment of ammunition 
and other stores is meant to be accomplished either ashore or by vertical replenishment at 
sea. Each can embark a helicopter detachment with at least one MH-60 helicopter (CNO, 
2014).  
What allows the LCS to be reconfigured to perform its three primary mission areas 
is a large, reconfigurable volume for a mission package (MP), which are customizable in 
order to modify the ship’s focused warfighting capability. For instance, in order for the 
LCS to conduct visit, board, search and seizure (VBSS) operations, the OPNAV instruction 
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outlines the required assets for the LCS’ SUW MP to include a maritime security module. 
Aside from the physical assets required to perform this mission, the MP is accompanied by 
personnel augmentations necessary to conduct mission-specific operations. The LCS’ 
biggest advantages are its shallow draft, large mission bay, and speed, which allow it to 
conduct specialized littoral operations such as “special operations forces (SOF) support, 
search and rescue (SAR), freedom of navigation (FON) operations, noncombatant 
evacuation operations (NEO), global fleet station, maritime law enforcement operations 
(LEO), and irregular warfare (IW)” (CNO, 2014).  
The OPNAV instruction defines the operating environment for the LCS as 
“forward-deployed wartime operations within the littoral coalition battle space” in support 
of a CSG and/or ESG as well as with joint and coalition partners. These operations would 
be restricted to water and air space occupied by both friendly and adversarial combatants 
that make timely identification and coordination challenging (CNO, 2014). Operations 
conducted forward during times of peace are also demanding, and may require the LCS to 
operate in areas that make it vulnerable to potential submarine, land-based missile, mine, 
terrorist, and other asymmetrical threats (CNO, 2014).  
Ng (2012) conducted research that examined whether or not the LCS could be 
utilized during HA/DR operations. His research goals were to study the viability of using 
an LCS to conduct these missions and propose possible Concepts of Operations (CONOPs) 
that would modify the existing IW MP to support HA/DR efforts. His research concluded 
by recommending that the Navy develop a specific IW MP for the LCS, with its aim being 
to support HA/DR operations. 
F. EXPEDITIONARY FAST TRANSPORT  
The Expeditionary Fast Transport (T-EPF), a lightweight, all-aluminum 
construction, is a unique combination of the attributes of a high-speed transport with a 
commercial ferry design. The platform, initially called the Joint High-Speed Vessel, 
weighs 1,646 tons, measures 338 feet long, and is considered the seafaring equivalent of a 
cargo aircraft. From a cost perspective, the T-EPF is considered a low-cost option to 
perform the mission, as the first-of-class ship was delivered at a cost of $185 million. Its 
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mission is logistical in nature, able to rearrange and reconfigure medium payloads of 
supplies and operational units for transport into areas that traditional deep-draft vessels 
may be unable to access (Jean, 2011). The T-EPF is manned with a civilian crew totaling 
41 members, but has a total of 144 berths and seating for 312 passengers. Designated a 
non-combatant vessel, it is allowed to operate in permissive environments or in higher 
threat environments when escorted by combatant vessels or other joint forces. In addition 
to supporting combat missions, the ship is touted as being able to execute “soft power” 
missions, including HA/DR operations, joint training exercises with U.S. and allied forces, 
and diplomatic engagements (Jean, 2011).  
In addition to its ability to move at high speeds, the T-EPF has a unique set of 
attributes, including a large cargo bay (approximately 20,000 square feet) able to 
accommodate 600 short tons of troops, supplies, and equipment. It also boasts RORO 
capability and a shallow draft that allows it to get in and out of smaller ports that ships with 
a deeper draft cannot traverse. The T-EPF’s wide beam and massive amount of space gives 
it significant logistics capabilities, but its catamaran design makes it difficult to operate the 
vessel in higher sea states. Because of the attributes mentioned previously, the T-EPF is 
able to deliver/provide essential support capabilities and supplies to dispersed locations as 
needed (Jean, 2011).  
The current iterations of the T-EPF include a flight deck capable of landing 
helicopters as large as a CH-53, which is the heaviest helicopter used by the Marine Corps. 
In addition to the landing pad, the flight deck has the capacity to park and store one 
additional rotary-wing aircraft up to an H-60. However, at this time, the T-EPF is not 
equipped with a helicopter hangar, making it incapable of embarking a helicopter 
detachment, though there have been talks of including it in future constructions of the 
platform (Lundquist, 2019). 
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III. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
We compiled qualitative and quantitative data for this project from several research 
documents on U.S. maritime response to HA/DR crises. This is particularly important for 
this subject as there is little to no research or practical use data on the LCS or T-EPF in 
HA/DR operations. Aside from modeling the existing data regarding the important 
characteristics of a maritime platform responding to an HA/DR crisis, we had to create our 
own comparisons for the LCS and T-EPF.  
Utilizing a qualitative data table developed from Greenfield and Ingram’s (2011) 
research on selecting maritime disaster response capabilities, we were able to perform 
comparisons among the CRUDES assets and the LCS and T-EPF. Similarly, we reviewed 
quantitative data from the Visibility and Management of Operating and Support Costs 
(VAMOSC), which Moffatt (2014) also used for his research on the cost of employing 
various platforms for HA/DR, to develop our own comparisons specifically between the 
CRUDES, LCS, and T-EPF platforms. 
We needed to compile the capabilities deemed important to HA/DR operations to 
be able to compare the LCS and T-EPF’s abilities against their CRUDES counterparts. We 
utilized the data table developed by Greenfield and Ingram (2011), who ranked 19 critical 
capabilities for each maritime platform that could be used during HA/DR operations. Those 
capabilities include aircraft support, the number of embarked aircraft, landing craft support, 
search and rescue (SAR), dry goods storage, refrigerated goods storage, freshwater 
production/storage, RORO, fuel storage/dispensation, self-sufficiency, personnel 
transfer/support, berthing capacity, medical support, transit speed, hydrographic survey, 
ability to conduct salvage operations, and towing. They used visual markers to indicate 
each ship’s ability to perform a task as having little to no capability to perform the mission 
set, having some capability to perform the mission set, and being very capable of 
performing the mission set (Greenfield & Ingram, 2011). Moffatt (2014) used these 
mission sets/capabilities to “score” each platform and added a component that considered 
each platform’s ability to embark its own helicopters when performing missions. Taking 
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our collected data for each ship type, we created a scaled down version of the table to use 
for our ship comparisons, as shown in Table 1. 
We also needed to consider the cost to deploy each asset. From a commander’s 
standpoint, this could be a key decision data point that may decide which assets are best 
suited to respond in the event of a disaster; the larger a ship is or the longer it is required 
to respond to a crisis, the more it will cost to keep it in operation. We took specific ship 
type data for each class of ship from the VAMOSC database to develop an annual cost to 
employ each ship type. The dollar values we gathered captured crew size and composition, 
fuel consumption rates, maintenance and repairable costs, contracted costs, consumables 
purchase data, and more. We calculated the total value of these factors and divided that 
cost by 365 to get a rough estimate of the average daily cost to deploy each asset. The costs 
we calculated are provided in Table 2.  
Utilizing the method employed by Moffat (2014) in his cost analysis of HA/DR 
operations, we were able to take the cost per day to employ each ship type and divide it by 
the ships’ calculated capabilities scores. As described by Moffat, this gave us a quick “bang 
for buck” breakdown of the various CRUDES platforms against the LCS and T-EPF. This 
is displayed in Table 3. 
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IV. DATA ANALYSIS 
A. CAPABILITY ANALYSIS 
Putting each of the CRUDES assets against the LCS and T-EPF assets, one can see 
that both the LCS and T-EPF are fairly comparable to those classes of ships in Table 1.  






























































































































































































CG 2 40 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 2 0 0 1 47
DDG FLT I 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 0 0 1 4
DDG FLT II 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 0 0 1 4
DDG FLT IIA 2 40 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 2 0 0 1 47
FFG 2 40 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 2 0 0 1 47
LCS (Freedom) 2 40 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 46
LCS(Independence) 1 20 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 26
Expeditionary Fast 
Transport 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 2 0 0 0 7  
The CRUDES assets, in particular the DDG FLT IIA and CG, achieve a total 
capability score of 47 (Moffat, 2014). Only slightly behind these are the Freedom-class and 
Independence-class variants of the LCS (46), and further behind is the T-EPF (6). The 
reasoning for the slight variance in these scores lies in the personnel support category, 
where they lose one point because the crews for the LCS are much smaller than their 
CRUDES counterparts; however, the larger gaps observed are due in large part to each 
platform’s ability to carry a two-aircraft helicopter detachment; the T-EPF in its current 
iteration is not able to accommodate a helicopter detachment at all.  
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It is important, then, to make the distinction that these slight variations do not 
necessarily constitute weaknesses that make the LCS and T-EPF less capable; in fact, there 
are a number of nuanced advantages that the data does not capture. By addressing some of 
the specific capabilities listed, we are able to better understand the LCS and T-EPF in terms 
of their ability to support HA/DR operations.  
 A platform’s capacity for carrying helicopters is a vitally important piece to 
HA/DR operations, as airlift, SAR, and personnel transport are critical during disaster relief 
operations; it is for this reason that there is a multiple added to this capability when 
calculating the overall capabilities score (Moffat, 2014). For the CRUDES platforms, 
utilizing their helicopter detachments in this fashion is one of the main contributions they 
provide when operating within a CSG or ARG responding to a disaster. The LCS variants, 
therefore, are just as capable in this regard, being able to support the same number and size 
of helicopters that their CRUDES counterparts can support, while being capable of 
supporting unmanned aerial systems as well (Makin, 2014). The flight decks on the LCS 
and T-EPF are also much larger, making them able to support landing larger aircraft than 
the CRUDES platforms can if the need for it should arise.  
A key weakness for the CRUDES ships identified in past HA/DR research is their 
inability to support carrying additional supplies outside of what is necessary for their own 
crews; storage onboard is minimal for any extra equipment that could be utilized for 
HA/DR support (Apte &Yoho, 2015). However, one of the key differences among the 
platforms is the fact that both LCS variants and the T-EPF enjoy large, modular mission 
bays that can accommodate relief supplies and equipment for HA/DR missions that the 
CRUDES assets cannot. The Independence-class LCS has a much larger mission bay than 
its Freedom-class counterpart, and T-EPF boasts a much larger mission bay than either 
variant of the LCS. For the LCS in particular, there has been an irregular warfare (IW) 
mission package that has been developed specifically for HA/DR support, including 
hospital beds, training facilities, and other critical care equipment that would be deemed 
vital to HA/DR support (GAO, 2013). For the T-EPF, “adaptive mission packages” exist 
that can meet the demands of the HA/DR mission, possessing the ability to outfit their over 
22,000 square-foot mission bays with self-contained shipping containers that secure to the 
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deck. These containers can contain anything from refrigeration units, medical stations, 
communication suites, and various other capabilities that merely plug up to the mission 
bay and are ready for use (Fontana, 2016). This capability slightly mitigates some of the 
disadvantages the T-EPF experiences in regard to its own self-sustainability for storage, as 
it can simply attach modules necessary to house refrigerated storage space, fresh water 
production equipment, or any other vital services if needed. In addition to the mission bays, 
the T-EPF has the unique advantages of having roll-on/roll-off capability and its own 
telescoping boom crane, meaning it can off-load supplies independently and has the ability 
to have vehicles come directly into its mission bay for on-load and off-load (MSC, 2018).  
One of the major drawbacks to the LCS and T-EPF is their crew size in comparison 
to the CRUDES assets. CRUDES platforms have a crew size of about 270–320 personnel, 
while the LCS and T-EPF are at about 40–70 personnel (Ng, 2015). This creates a situation 
in which fatigue of the crew can become a factor as there are more personnel available on 
a CRUDES platform to support the tasks required to conduct HA/DR operations. The 
limited size of the LCS also prevents the ability to berth and transport personnel, and 
neither the LCS nor the T-EPF have adequate organic medical facilities onboard capable 
of long-term HA/DR support. The T-EPF has a unique advantage over the LCS variants 
and the CRUDES platforms, however, because it has 100 berthing spaces in addition to 
those used for the ship’s crew, as well as a personnel transport bay (similar to a ferry) that 
can move about 300 personnel if needed.  
Lastly, transit speed is an advantage shared among the CRUDES, LCS, and T-EPF 
platforms. Able to move at speeds in excess of 30 knots, any of these smaller platforms can 
move toward an area much quicker than any of the larger, more capable HA/DR platforms. 
However, the LCS variants and T-EPF have a much higher advantage over their CRUDES 
counterparts in terms of their relatively low draft. At just over 12–15 feet of draft, the LCS 
variants and the T-EPF are well suited for operating in littoral areas, meaning they are able 
to get in much closer to land and can navigate into various port sizes much easier than their 
CRUDES counterparts. This is an important distinction among the ship classes because 
this is a limiting factor for CRUDES assets that affected their ability to provide support to 
disasters in the past. In environments where a port is likely to be affected by a natural 
disaster, having a much lower draft affords the LCS variants and the T-EPF the opportunity 
to easily enter port to off-load supplies, pick up personnel, and otherwise move freely 
throughout the affected area.  
B. COST ANALYSIS
The next measure considered for comparison was cost per platform. Deploying 
assets, whether in line with deployment schedules or specific mission objectives, bears with 
it an associated cost that fleet commanders must consider. By the numbers, the CG is the 
costliest asset to employ at approximately $200,000 per day; by contrast, the least costly 
asset to employ is the T-EPF at about $61,000 per day. Cost data for the DDG Flight 1 and 
Flight 2 were included with the intention of comparing that data to the other platforms, but 
will not be analyzed thoroughly due to their relatively low capability score. Similarly, the 
cost data for the FFG will not be analyzed thoroughly as it is no longer active and is meant 
to be replaced by the LCS. As shown in Table 2, the daily cost to deploy an FFG in 2014, 
which is the last year a ship of that class was in service, is very similar to the current cost 
to deploy a Freedom-class LCS, while the FFG is significantly less costly per day to deploy 
than the Independence-class LCS. The daily cost to deploy the DDG (Flight 2A) differs by 
$30,000 and $73,000, respectively, for the Independence- and Freedom-class LCS 
platforms. If a fleet commander was faced with a decision as to which asset to use for an 
HA/DR mission, and each of the platforms shown in Table 2 were available options, the 
Freedom-class LCS and the T-EPF would be the least costly options. Furthermore, the 
daily cost of the Freedom-class LCS and the T-EPF combined would be about $36,000 less 
than the daily cost of the CG and $13,000 less than the daily cost of the DDG (Flight 2A). 
Even when comparing the combined cost of the Independence-class LCS, which is much 
greater than the Freedom-class, and the T-EPF, it only exceeds the cost of the CG by just 
over $6,000, and exceeds the cost of the DDG (Flight 2A) by just over $30,000. The 
$30,000 difference associated with the DDG (Flight 2A) and the Independence-class 
LCS/T-EPF platforms seems significant but could be justified by the fact that there are two 
platforms available rather than one.  
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Table 2. Cost to Deploy per Ship Type 
Ship Type Cost to Deploy (Year) Cost to Deploy (Day)
Cruiser $69,914,085.00 $191,545.44
Destroyer (Flight 1) $66,617,668.00 $182,514.16
Destroyer (Flight 2) $64,060,665.00 $175,508.67
Destroyer (Flight 2A) $61,108,433.00 $167,420.36
Frigate (up to 2014) $36,068,267.00 $98,817.17




Taken together, the ship’s capabilities scores combined with their cost to deploy 
are able to give a rough estimate of the associated cost per capability of each ship type that 
mission commanders can utilize to understand which platform can provide the most use 
for the cost and capabilities they bring to bear. A low cost per capability could indicate that 
the platform has many capabilities that may prove useful in the event of an HA/DR mission 
as its associate cost to deploy is spread among its various capabilities. Similarly, high cost 
per capability could indicate that the platform may have fewer capabilities to bring to bear 
during an HA/DR operation, driving their cost per capability higher. 
Both classes of LCS, which could be considered most comparable to the cruiser 
and destroyer (Flight 2A) platforms in terms of capabilities scores, have significantly lower 
cost per capability than their counterparts. At 43% less than the cost per capability of a 
destroyer (Flight 2A) and about 50% less than the cost per capability of a cruiser, the 
Freedom-class LCS displays the lowest cost per capability of any of the platforms being 
compared, making it the most viable platform for use in terms of HA/DR support; the 
Independence-class LCS comes in next at 27% less than the cost per capability of a cruiser 
and 16% less than the cost per capability of a destroyer (Flight 2A). The T-EPF, with 
capability scores comparable to the destroyer (Flights 1 and 2), is roughly 80% less than 
the cost per capability of either destroyer. 
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Table 3. Non-Air Capable vs. Air-Capable Cost Per Capability Comparison 
Non-Air-Capable Platforms Cost per Capability Air-Capable Platforms Cost per Capability
Destroyer (Flight 1) 45,628.54$           Cruiser (CG) 4,075.43$             
Destroyer (Flight 2) 43,877.17$           Destroyer (Flight 2A) 3,562.14$             
Expeditionary Fast Transport (T-EPF) 8,707.13$             Littoral Combat Ship (Independence-class) 2,979.24$             
Frigate (FFG) 2,102.49$             
Littoral Combat Ship (Freedom-class) 2,039.14$             
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V. CONCLUSION 
The purpose of our analysis was to determine the feasibility of utilizing the LCS 
and T-EPF for HA/DR missions and to determine how well they compare in terms of 
capability and cost to CRUDES platforms. Our scope was limited to observing only the 
capabilities that each platform is able to perform for HA/DR support, and to compare the 
cost associated with employing each platform; the intent was not to proclaim the LCS or 
T-EPF to be the primary option for HA/DR support, but rather to highlight their ability to 
be used in this capacity when fleet commanders consider options for supporting HA/DR 
missions. As previous research has suggested and our initial analysis concluded, the 
limitations of the LCS, T-EPF, and CRUDES platforms in terms of their size and 
capabilities generally makes them incapable of providing significant long-term assistance 
for HA/DR missions. However, utilizing the LCS and T-EPF as potential first responders 
for short-term mission support seems to provide the most value for the capabilities they 
possess as opposed to being part of the more sustained operations performed by larger 
platforms such as the LHD, LHA, or the LPD.  
The LCS and T-EPF are able to meet the same capability expectations as the 
CRUDES assets, but nuanced differences such as their large mission bays, large flight 
decks, and low draft that allows them access to more restrictive littoral areas set them apart 
from their CRUDES counterparts. Specifically, for the T-EPF, its additional capacity for 
transporting personnel could be a key difference maker in terms of the small crew size it 
has in comparison to the CRUDES platforms. The T-EPF also brings the added, albeit 
smaller RORO capability, which can be leveraged in being able to move relief supplies 
independently of any pier-side support as well as movement of casualties to more suitable 
support areas. Drawbacks in utilizing these platforms center mainly around the crew size, 
which is significantly smaller than any of the platforms being used for comparison. The 
relatively small crew size could result in increased mission fatigue on the crew due to lack 
of depth in personnel rotation, limited ability to cope with large casualty numbers, and 
potential inability to perform multiple mission sets at once.  
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From a cost perspective, both the LCS and T-EPF are cheaper to operate than the 
CRUDES platforms. It is relevant to point out that our analysis did not account for the 
additional cost incurred by the Navy when the CRUDES assets are diverted from their 
primary missions to HA/DR missions. The cost benefits offered by both LCS platforms 
and the T-EPF make the option to utilize them specifically as HA/DR support platforms 
more viable. Given their relatively low cost to deploy, both the T-EPF and the LCS 
platforms could be used together to offer similar, if not more viable capabilities than any 
singular CRUDES platform at a similar price point.  
As great power competition among the United States, Russia, and China continues 
to grow, it becomes increasingly important that CRUDES assets are able to remain focused 
on their primary mission sets in order to meet potential threats. The capacity of the LCS 
and T-EPF to meet the expectations for HA/DR first responder support provides mission 
commanders a viable option that allows them to keep CRUDES assets focused on their 
primary missions. It should be noted that the best advantage for utilizing the LCS and T-
EPF platforms would come from employing them directly from their homeports rather than 
diverting them from an assigned mission. This would allow them to load, carry, and directly 
deliver much of the requisite support equipment in their large mission bays, thereby 
maximizing their ability to support HA/DR missions, which is listed as a core competency 
in the NMS.  
There are several areas for future research that necessitate a deeper look into the 
utilization of the LCS and T-EPF such as the proximity of their homeports to disaster-prone 
areas, the effective amount of time they can remain on station to support an HA/DR 
mission, how the capabilities of the LCS and T-EPF can be best utilized to meet the 
demands of an HA/DR environment, and any additional costs associated with outfitting 
them for HA/DR.  
The LCS and T-EPFs can be found in almost all of the Navy’s high fleet 
concentration areas, with some forward deployed to areas such as Singapore, Souda Bay, 
the Middle East, and Japan. Future research could identify the associated travel time it 
would take to reach disaster-prone areas and how that compares with diverting assets to 
respond. Understanding their limitations in size and carrying capacity will ultimately affect 
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their ability to loiter and provide support; therefore, further analysis needs to be conducted 
on the optimal time these platforms can remain on station and how that may affect their 
overall cost. To further understand how to best leverage the advantages that the LCS and 
T-EPF have in terms of their mission bays, analysis is necessary to determine the 
combinations of mission modules and equipment that would be best suited for various 
HA/DR mission scenarios as well as the associated costs to procure and field these 
technologies aboard each platform. Current configurations on both the LCS and T-EPF 
platforms allow for adaptive force packages to be loaded and plugged into their mission 
bays (Lundquist, 2019). Modular disaster relief technology continues to improve, and some 
of these medical packages have been designed specifically to be loaded, assembled, and 
utilized either within the mission bays of any adaptive platform or as “flat packs” that can 
be carried and off-loaded directly into an area for HA/DR support (Lye, 2019; Spitzer et 
al., 2020). In either case, the associated costs of employing these packages will have to be 
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